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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of capital controls in the transmission of global commodity 
price shocks in explaining domestic business cycles variance in 89 countries for the period 
1995–2013. The results suggest that relatively closed and open countries have lower 
variance in output, consumption and investments explained by global shocks than those 
countries who have partially liberalised capital markets. On the contrary, relatively closed 
and open economies have a much higher share of the trade balance to output ratio 
volatility explained than partially liberalized countries. Although this pattern does not 
depend on the level of economic development or geographical regions, within groups the 
share explained by global shocks varies and statistical significance of the differences is 
rather weak. The results show that partial liberalisation of the capital account might make 
countries more vulnerable to world shocks, than opening and closing the capital account 
completely.  
Keywords: World Shocks, Capital Controls, Capital Account Liberalisation 
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1. Introduction 
Discussion about imposing capital control has been re-opened since the Great Recession. 
After a period of strong move against financial market liberalisation when controls were 
argued to limit the economic progress and efficiency, they are again considered to be a useful 
policy tool. Capital controls can help to stabilise the domestic economy against world shocks, 
and are seen as a protective measure, especially against large capital inflows generating 
booms as well as outflows during the crises. Therefore, the understanding of the international 
environment and the effects of different control mechanisms are essential for policymakers 
to integrate the expected impact that world shocks have on domestic economy to the 
monetary and fiscal policy decisions.  
This thesis investigates the role of capital controls in the transmission mechanism process 
from world commodity price shocks to domestic business cycles. More specifically, I 
concentrate on the prices of agricultural commodities, metals and minerals, and fuels, to 
analyse their effect on macroeconomic variables like output, consumption, investment and 
trade balance to output ratio. Commodity markets are a prime example of international trade 
and prices reflect the developments in the world economy. Dividing sample countries into 
three capital control categories gives a possibility to track differences in the financial 
liberalisation and draw comparisons between countries with more open capital and closed 
capital accounts. Furthermore, studying the results in different categories like income groups, 
commodity and trade net exporters and importers, allows to determine the possible patterns 
of capital controls in explaining the world shocks in domestic markets. Before the analysis I 
set the following hypotheses coming from macroeconomic theory (Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1996), that opening capital accounts should: increase output volatility, decrease the volatility 
of consumption thorough higher consumption smoothing, raise investment volatility and 
make trade balance more unstable. The share of volatility created by world should increase 
as countries open up their capital accounts. From a theoretical perspective, higher degree of 
capital mobility is expected to enhance specialisation in goods that countries have 
comparative advantage. This makes output more volatile, as well as investment, because 
opening capital accounts provides better investment opportunities, allowing diversify 
country-specific productivity shocks. In closed economies output fluctuations have an 
immediate effect on consumption, while opening capital accounts gives a country the 
possibility to smooth its consumption by using the capital from international markets (Razin 
and Rose 1992). 
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The closest paper to the thesis is Fernandez, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) who analyse 
the shares of variances that global shocks generate in domestic business cycles.   
The novelty of the paper is to combine two controversial issues and investigate the role 
capital controls play in mediating the effects of global shocks to domestic business cycles 
through commodity prices. Previously, the papers have not considered capital controls in the 
transmission process of world shocks, neither have they looked at capital account 
liberalisation from the perspective of global shocks. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to 
analyse the extent to which multiple commodity prices mediate the effects of global shocks 
to domestic business cycles. Paper uses the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) capital control indices. The 
paper divides countries into three categories based on Klein (2012): Open, Gate and Wall. 
This allows to investigate the connection between financial liberalisation and the 
transmission of global shocks. 
Several findings emerge from this paper. Firstly, the main conclusion of this paper is that 
capital controls have a role in mediating global shocks to domestic business cycles The shares 
of output variances explained by global shocks in countries with strong capital control are 
smaller than in countries, who have liberalised their capital accounts either partly or fully. 
However, the relationship is not linear, Gate countries, who have partially liberalised their 
financial markets, are the most influenced by international shocks in output.  
Second, the closed Wall group manages to protect from consumption volatility generated by 
world shocks only to a certain extent. Partly liberalised countries are effected the most, as the 
share of variance coming from the world fluctuations is the largest.  
Third, contrary to expected results, the share of world shocks explaining trade balance 
volatility is the highest in the Wall group that should be in theory be more protected from 
world shocks. Moreover also the absolute volatility of the trade balance is the highest in the 
Wall group. 
Fourth result of this paper is that among both commodity and oil exporting countries, world 
shocks explain almost two times more of the variance in business cycles in output and 
consumption, whereas in Open countries world shocks explain higher share of variance in 
trade balance to output ratio.  
8 
 
Lastly, the data shows clearly that capital controls are used more in countries that have lower 
income and are still considered as developing countries. This is supported by earlier results 
in which literature suggests that countries with lower income levels should liberalise their 
capital accounts after reaching a certain level of institutional and financial development, 
therefore it makes sense, that capital controls are still in place among lower income groups. 
The identification of the effect relies on the assumption that the extent of capital controls 
introduced is exogenous to the business cycle developments and to the share of world shocks 
explaining domestic variables. It is possible that only the countries that are not sensitive to 
world shocks open up their capital accounts completely and therefore self-select in the Open 
group. Partly the results that Wall countries are relatively more volatile than Gate and Open 
countries could reflect it, but analysis by different level of development and various grou5ps 
shows main results are not sensitive to observable differences. Financial market liberalisation 
was strongly suggested to all countries by the International Monetary Fund, alleviating the 
concerns that countries self-selected to liberalise. Also many papers have shown that capital 
controls are exogenously decided and do not depend on the business cycle (IMF 2012). 
Earlier literature has found that world interest rate and terms of trade shocks are the main 
drivers of business cycles in small open economies. For example Lubik and Teo (2005) found 
out that world interest rate and terms of trade shocks constitute together a wide range - from 
10% to 90% - of output fluctuation. Whereas Blankenau et al. (2001) estimate the share to 
be much smaller, saying that around one third of changes in output are explained by world 
interest rate. The estimates differ so vastly because of the method, dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) methods tend to have bigger intervals, whereas vector autoregression 
(VAR) models give more exact answers. Cross and Nquyen (2016) focus the effect of global 
oil price shocks and found that the impacts on China's output are small and temporary. 
Similarly, there are different views on capital controls, economists have even used different 
measures of capital controls to study capital accounts. Some rely on International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report in Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER), the others construct their own indicator. Calderon et al. (2005) concluded after 
studying the relationship between international integration and country’s external 
vulnerability, that opening capital accounts promises higher growth and the effect is even 
stronger when the financial system is stable. Also Klein and Olivei (1999) find the positive 
effect of financial liberalisation only among industrialised countries. There are also 
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researchers that find little evidence in favour of financially open countries having higher 
growth prospects (Stiglitz 2000, Rodrik 1998, Kraay 1998). They even do not support the 
arguments that the institutional background of a country helps to realise more beneficial 
effects to a country. 
The paper is structured as followed. Section 2 gives an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 introduces the method used for analysing, whereas section 4 describes the data. 
Section 5 shows and discusses the results of the analysis, while section 6 concludes and 
summarizes the paper.  
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2. Literature review 
This section gives a short summary of the literature to place the paper in broader context and 
help to understand the results. As the paper discusses the role of capital controls in mediating 
the effects of global macroeconomic shocks to domestic business cycles, the literature review 
describes the possible transmission channels of world shocks to domestic economies and 
analyses the role and essence of capital controls. I will first give a general overview of the 
literature on the importance international transmission of shocks and continue with papers 
that study the role of capital controls and the positive and negative effects of capital account 
liberalisation on the economy.  
2.1. International transmission of shocks 
Earlier papers have been trying to find out the main drivers of business cycles for years and 
the list of driving forces grows, including for example productivity shocks, shocks to terms 
of trade and to preferences, monetary and fiscal shocks or commodity price shocks. 
Estimating the contribution of the shocks to domestic business cycles has made a lot of 
researchers believe, that the main drivers are terms of trade and interest rate shocks, whereas 
the exact contribution of the shock varies strongly across different studies and even depends 
on the econometrical method used conducting a survey. The most used econometrical 
methods for analysing the effects of international shocks to domestic business cycles are 
DSGE, VAR together with its different extensions, for example structural VAR (SVAR1) or 
factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) or even the combination between VAR and DSGE. 
Mendoza (1991) conducted the first survey using a calibrated DSGE model to study the 
Canada’s business cycle regularities from 1946 to 1985, where he concluded that exogenous 
shocks follow the fluctuations in productivity or terms of trade. The latter one was pointed 
out as an appealing topic for future research, as this model gives a framework for the studying 
the business cycles arising from terms of trade shocks. Mendoza (1995) himself focused on 
the relationship between terms of trade and business cycles in seven largest industrialised 
countries (G7) from 1995 until 1990 and 23 developing countries between 1960 and 1990. 
There the model captures the transmission mechanisms of terms of trade shocks through 
international capital mobility, overall purchasing power of exports and the cost of imported 
inputs, Mendoza (1995) concludes that the terms of trade shocks are persistent, weakly 
                                                 
1 SVAR – Structural vector autoregression method by adding economic restriction to an otherwise statistical 
modelling method in order to identify the exact sources for macroeconomic fluctuations proposed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) 
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procyclical and account for about half of the observed variability of GDP and real exchange 
rate.  
Kose and Riezman (1999) came to same conclusion among developing countries. After 
constructing a DSGE model reflecting the structural characteristics of a 20 non-oil exporting 
African countries from 1970 to 1990, they found out that almost 45% of the fluctuations in 
aggregate GDP is explained by trade shocks, whereas financial shocks only play a minor role 
and world interest rate fluctuations have no significant impact on economic dynamics. On 
the contrast, Blankenau et al. (2001) show using DSGE models based on Canadian dataset 
from 1960–1996 that world interest rate shocks have an important role in explaining up to 
one-third of the changes in GDP.  
These papers obtained very different results – both, terms of trade and world interest rate 
shocks can account for varying amounts of the fluctuations in small open economies. This 
gave motivation to Lubik and Teo (2005) to use Bayesian methods to estimate DSGE models 
in 5 countries with different background – Australia (1978–2004), Canada (1981–2004), New 
Zealand (1987–2004), Mexico and Chile (both 1996–2004). They found that world interest 
rate shocks are the main driving sources of business cycles in small open economies, the 
mean levels of contribution of world interest rate shocks to output fluctuations range from 
40% to 75%, whereas terms of trade shocks have very small contribution, explaining less 
than 3% of output movements.   
Hoffmaister and Roldos (1997) approach to this topic by using SVAR method. They found 
that from 1970 to 1991 the terms of trade shocks explained around 7% of the fluctuations in 
output among 15 Asian and 17 Latin American countries. In history the macroeconomic 
fluctuations in developing countries are similar, especially between Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Therefore, Hoffmaister et al. (1998) used the same method in estimating the 
effect of trade shock on 23 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa from 1971 to 1993 and found 
the terms of trade shock is estimated to explain a slightly higher share, 16% of the fluctuations 
in output. In analysing the differences with Mendoza’s (1991) findings, they explained that 
the vast differences can come from the fact that Mendoza does not allow for domestic demand 
shocks and world interest rate shocks, which makes terms of trade shock to pick up also the 
effect of these shocks, especially world interest rates (Hoffmaister, Roldos 1997). 
Changes in the prices of different commodities, like oil or food, can also affect heavily 
domestic business cycles. Cross and Nguyen (2016) study the effect of global oil price shocks 
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on China’s output over the data period from 1992 to 2015 and find in their analysis using 
VAR that the impacts of intertemporal global oil price shocks on China’s output are small 
and temporary. Oil supply together with specific oil demand shock generally produce 
negative movements in Chinas GDP growth whilst oil demand shocks tend to have positive 
effects. Rapsomanikis and Mugera (2011) focus on the changes in food prices in developing 
markets (Ethiopia, India and Malawi), their results point out that short-run adjustment to 
world price changes in incomplete while volatility spill overs are significant only during 
periods of extreme world market volatility, but this extreme volatility is due to domestic, 
rather than world market shocks.  
During last decades the factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) has been used in many studies that 
concentrate on especially the effect that monetary policy has on the economy. FAVAR is not 
limited by restricted set of variables, allowing to use a broader set of variables that policy 
makers and researchers are interest in and makes it possible to trace back the effects of global 
developments on different macroeconomic variables as it takes into account the additional 
information that central banks and private sector have. Moreover it allows to use less arbitrary 
measures like employment level instead of measures of real variables. (Bernanke et al. 2004) 
When SVAR and DSGE tend to be more used on developing countries, then FAVAR 
approach allows for larger information set making it more suitable to use among developed 
countries to describe what kind of impact do different monetary policy measures have on 
overall economy. As in this paper I concentrate on the role of capital control through 
commodity price shocks, the only short summary of monetary policies is made. For example 
Lagana and Mountford (2005) follow Bernanke et al. (2005) in also applying Stock and 
Watson (2002) two step principal component approach to monetary policy in a balanced 
panel containing 105 monthly observations for the UK from 1992 to 2003 covering 10 
categories (employment; government finance; consumer and retail confidence; money and 
loans; interest rates; stock prices etc.). They show that the UK is affected by the changes in 
foreign interest rates and their results show clearly that using FAVAR method with different 
possible factors generates models with better prediction qualities and provide a reasonable 
explanation to unexpected increases in interest rates and how to get rid of price puzzle2 
                                                 
2 Price puzzle – the initial positive response of prices to contractionary monetary policy shock. The term first 
used by Eichenbaum (1992) in a commentary on “Macroeconomic and reality” by Sims (1980), a study on the 
effects of monetary policy in several countries. Often referred to as “puzzling” because macroeconomic models 
are having troubles to explain it theoretically or, even when capable of explaining it in principle, as they do not 
produce a positive price response empirically.  
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problem. Vasishtha and Maier (2013) conduct a similar study based on Canadian dataset from 
1985 to 2008. Their results indicate that shock to global interest rates and global inflation do 
not affect Canada as much as in the UK. Canada is more influenced by the shock to foreign 
activity or commodity prices, which tend to lower the economic activity and hurt the demand 
for Canadian exports. 
Lombardi et al. (2012) studied more specifically the relationship between non-energy 
commodity prices (metals and food) and different macroeconomic variables. After estimating 
FAVAR they found out that exchange rates and economic activity affect individual non-
energy commodity prices, but they cannot find an effect from interest rate. Additionally, the 
individual commodity prices are affected by common trends that the food and metals factors 
successfully captured.  
This sub-chapter gave an overview of different international shocks transmission mechanism, 
showing that the results vary heavily. As the many focus of this paper is to find out the role 
of capital controls, then an overview of them is given next.  
 
2.2. Capital Controls 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) defines in its Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements (2009) capital controls as “rules, taxes or fees 
associated with financial transaction that discriminate between domestic residents and those 
outside the country”. They can be divided into two sets of measures: administrative or 
market-based measures. The last on includes taxes on cross-border capital transactions; an 
unremunerated reserve requirement and a differential bank reserve requirements for resident 
and non-resident accounts. Whereas administrative controls consist of outright prohibitions 
and limits on foreign borrowing or lending and requires primary government approval for 
international capital transactions. (Klein 2012) 
Throughout the history, the attitude towards capital controls has been shaped by different 
events in global economy and capital markets that made countries to impose capital controls. 
Capital controls were broadly introduced with Bretton Woods after the World War in 1944 
to build up a stable financial system. Then capital controls were destabilizing and countries 
could not have free capital mobility and free trade in goods at the same time. (Ghosh ad 
Quereshi 2016) Already in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the economy had stabilised, then 
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countries started to eliminate capital controls. For example in the 1990s capital controls 
towards emerging countries were seen as undesirable as they distort the international 
allocation of capital. Already at the turn of the century several financial and exchange-rate 
crises made economists and policy makers blame free capital mobility as the reason for real-
exchange-rate overvaluation or over-borrowing etc. As a result some countries that had 
liberalised their capital accounts started to re-introduce capital controls. That kind of 
behaviour accelerated after the onset of Great Recession, when both advanced economies 
(Ireland, Iceland) and emerging markets (Brazil, Turkey and Peru) imposed capital controls. 
Governments saw capital account closing as a protective measure against inflow-fuelled 
exchange rate appreciating and potentially destabilizing asset price booms. (Klein 2012) 
All this led many economists to rethink the pains and gains of financial liberalisation, but the 
topic remained controversial and divides the economists and policy makers still into two parts 
– in favour and against capital account liberalisation as empirical analysis has yet failed to 
yield conclusive results. Magud et al. (2011) draw out that the situation is made worse by the 
fact that capital controls’ literature does not have common grounds and unified theoretical 
framework that helps to analyse the macroeconomic consequences of financial liberalisation 
as well as compare different the results of different empirical studies.  
There are a large number of different indicators and indices that measure the capital account 
openness of a country. The first measures of financial integrations were mainly compiled on 
the basis of AREAR, which is a report published by IMF gathering the rules and regulations 
to govern current and capital transaction as well as the proceedings arising from them 
between residents and non-residents (Quinn et al. 2011). Epstein and Schor (1992) developed 
the first indicators of capital controls by converting AREAER into binary variable. Johnston 
and Tamirisa (1998) included different asset categories and the type of investor to the analysis 
that allowed them to construct Financial Openness Index (FOI). This is a cumulative total of 
binary scores of 13 categories distinguishing between inflows and outflows, but fails to 
distinguish between capital inflows and outflows. Miniane (2004) altered the capital control 
index in order to track world trends towards greater capital account openness. He points out 
that capital controls should control capital movement and explain how economic shocks 
influence local markets, while taking into account the channels through which they come. In 
other words, Miniane divided capital flows between inflows and outflows to understand 
where they come from. Chinn and Ito (2008) covered 181 countries from 1970 to 2005 and 
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created an index to measure the extent and intensity of openness in capital account 
transactions to quantify capital controls (KAOPEN). They assigned four dummy variables 
from AREAER that indicate, whether there are multiple exchange rates present; restrictions 
on current or capital account transactions and if the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds is imposed. This makes KAOPEN a standardised indicator over four AREAER 
table variables, where higher scores indicate greater openness.  
Magud et al. (2011) focused on the comparability of different studies about capital controls 
and after standardising the results of more than 30 empirical studies, they constructed two 
indices of capital controls: Capital Control Effectiveness Index (CCE), and Weighted Capital 
Control Effectiveness Index (WCCE). In order to assign values to the results of the papers, 
they asked these following questions, that the capital controls are expected to achieve: 
 Are capital controls able to reduce the volume of capital flows? 
 Do they alter the composition of capital flow toward longer maturity flows? 
 Do they reduce real exchange rate pressures? 
 Are capital controls able to allow for a more independent monetary policy? 
If the answer to the question was positive, then the corresponding value was 1 and in case of 
negative value was –1. If the paper did not address to the issue, then the corresponding value 
was 0. After conducting and summarizing the indices, Magud et al. (2011) found that capital 
controls on inflows make monetary policy more independent and reduce real exchange rate 
pressures.  
As in this paper, I have the core focus on the role of capital controls in the process, where 
commodity prices transfer global shocks to domestic business cycles. Therefore, it is more 
relevant to give an overview of the effects of financial liberalisation and macroeconomic 
performance. 
Calderon et al. (2005) studies the relationship between international integration and 
country’s external vulnerability and concluded that financial openness does not harm the 
economic growth of a country. Based on 76 countries covering the period from 1970 to 2000, 
they find out that there is no evidence that neither trade nor financial openness causes a 
decline in economic growth. On the contrary, there is a positive effect between opening 
capital account and higher growth, which increases with the development level of a country. 
Similarly, they found no evidence that higher degree of financial openness also increases 
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growth volatility, but their study supported the fact, that if the country’s financial system is 
stable, then financial openness can even decrease the growth volatility. 
Additionally, Klein and Olivei (1999) find that capital account liberalisation promotes 
growth among industrialised countries, but they cannot find supportive evidence on positive 
effect among developing countries. They analyse 20 OECD and 18 non-OECD countries 
over the period of 1986 to 1995 doing two steps: first they focus on the effect of capital 
account liberalisation on financial development and then they consider the effect of financial 
development on the overall growth. These findings suggest that capital account liberalisation 
can only be beneficial if there is strong institutional background and sound macroeconomic 
policies. Similarly, Prasad et al. (2013) were not able to conclude that there are strong 
empirical connections between financial globalisation, macroeconomic volatility and growth, 
but they did stress, that making the solid institutional grounds for financial liberalisation can 
help to put a country into better position to benefit from financial globalisation. Moreover, 
Bekaert et al. (2005) stressed that countries with better legal system, good institutions, 
favourable conditions for foreign investment, and investor protection generate larger growth 
effects. 
On the contrary, there are a lot of economists who somehow follow Stiglitz (2000), who has 
stated “there is no compelling case for capital market liberalisation, as there is no compelling 
case against market liberalisation”. Meaning they do not support the view that financial 
openness also enhances country’s growth, but at the same time have failed to provide 
evidence stating that financial openness has negative effect on country’s economy. Kraay 
(1998) finds that there is little evidence suggesting that financially open countries have higher 
volatility of capital flows. He also considers the possible reason behind the outcome, that 
there are no results and concludes that existing measures of capital account liberalisation and 
supportive policies. Rodrik (1998) studies the possible relationship investments and capital 
controls and he concludes that there are not even evidence in support of the fact that capital 
account liberalisation in countries with stronger public institutions.  
In summary, the studies concerning capital controls carry different results because there is 
no common ground how to approach this issue and different researchers use even different 
measurements of capital controls. Still none of the papers find negative relationship between 
financial liberalisation and economic growth, but positive or no relationship at all.  
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3. Method 
In empirical part of the master thesis to estimate the shares of variances transferred to 
domestic business cycles through commodity prices, I use the same approach, data and code 
as Fernandez, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016)3. In order to analyse the role of capital 
controls, I restrict the dataset with capital controls and divide it to different subset to study 
the relationships more thoroughly.  
As the focus of the thesis is on the role of capital controls, then the method has been adjusted 
to have applicable results under the hypothesis raised in this work. The capital control indices 
were gathered by Schindler in 2009 and are based on the annual analysis report AREAER 
compiled by IMF that distinguishes capital controls using three factors gathered in Table 1. 
Table 1. Asset and Transaction Categories for Capital Control Measures 
Assets that Each Include Four Transaction Categories 
  mm Money market (Bonds with maturity of 1 year or less) 
  bo Bonds (Bonds with maturity more than 1 year) 
  eq Equities 
  ci Collective investments 
  de Derivatives 
   Categories 
   Inflow Controls 
   _plbn Purchase Locally by Non-Residents 
   _siar Sale or Issue Abroad by residents 
   Outflow Controls 
   _pabr Purchase Abroad by Residents 
    _siln Sale or Issue Locally by Non-Residents 
Assets that Include Only Inflow (i) or Outflow (o) Categories 
  gsi and gso Guarantees, Sureties and Financial Backup Facilities  
  fci and fco Financial Credits 
  cci and cco Commercial Credits 
Real Estate 
  Re Real Estate 
   Categories   
   Outflow   
   _pabr Real Estate Purchase Abroad by Residents 
   _slbn Sale Locally By Non-Residents 
   Inflow   
    _plbn Real Estate Purchase Locally By Non-Residents 
Direct Investments 
  dii Direct Investment Controls on Inflows 
  dio Direct Investment Controls on Outflows 
  ldi Direct Investment Controls on Liquidation 
Source: Fernandez et al. (2015) 
                                                 
3 Data together with Matlab necessary codes for replication are available at:  
http://www.columbia.edu/~mu2166/fsu/ 
18 
 
In order to study the role of capital controls in mediating the effects of global shocks to 
domestic business cycles, I follow the approach of Fernandez et al. (2016) by estimating 
structural VAR with two blocs, foreign and domestic. As it assumed that the world 
commodity prices are exogenous for every country, then foreign bloc is the same for every 
country and consists of commodity price indices of agriculture, metals and minerals, and 
fuels.  
Formally the price vector is denoted by: 
𝑝𝑡 = [
𝑝𝑡
𝑎
𝑝𝑡
𝑓
𝑝𝑡
𝑚
],     
where 𝑝𝑡
𝑎, 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑝𝑡
𝑚 are the cyclical components of the natural logarithms of prices of 
agricultural, fuel and metal and minerals commodities, the trend from real interest rate is 
removed by using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 100.  
Moreover, it is assumed that the price vector follows first-order autoregressive model 
(Fernandez et al. 2016):  
𝑝𝑡 = 𝐴𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡,     (1) 
where A is the matrix of coefficients and 𝜇𝑡 denotes a vector of world shocks affecting 
commodity prices. It is an independent and identically distributed mean-zero random vector 
with variance-covariance matrix Σ𝜇. I am interested in finding out what fraction of business 
cycle fluctuations in different countries is the result of the world shocks, and mediated 
through the three previous commodity prices. For that reason, the joint contribution of 𝜇𝑡 is 
the main focus and the three individual shocks do not need to be identified 
The domestic bloc on the other hand is describes separately every country and consists of 
real GDP, real consumption, real investments, terms of trade, trade balance to output ratio as 
well as the before mentioned commodity prices. The formula is as follows (Fernandez et al. 
2016): 
𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝐶
𝑖𝑌𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖,   (2) 
where 𝜖𝑡
𝑖 is an innovation with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ𝑖. Similarly to 
foreign bloc, the country-specific domestic bloc (2) is estimated by ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) and all variables are detrended before using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter 
equal to 100.  
Combining foreign (1) and domestic blocs (2), it is possible to estimate the joint behaviour 
of commodity prices 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 in a following autoregressive model (Fernandez et al. 2016): 
[
𝑝𝑡
𝑌𝑡
] = 𝐹 [
𝑝𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
] + 𝐺 [
𝜇𝑡
𝜖𝑡
],     (3) 
where 
𝐹 = [
𝐴 𝜃
𝐷𝐴 + 𝐵 𝐶
],      𝐺 = [
𝐼 𝜃
𝐷 𝐼
],      and      𝐸 = [
𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡′ 𝜇𝑡𝜖𝑡′
𝜇𝑡𝜖𝑡′ 𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡′
] = Σ ≡ [
Σμ 𝜃
𝜃 Σr
] 
Estimates B, C, D and Σ𝑖 are country-specific, which gives the possibility to obtain an 
estimate of the contribution of world shocks (𝜇𝑡) to movements in domestic macroeconomic 
indicators (Yt) in different countries after doing the variance decomposition. It is important 
to draw out that world shocks can only affect small open economies through changes in world 
prices, for example commodity prices or the world interest rate.  
In the original the Fernandez et al. (2016) use two ways to estimate the domestic bloc, 
because there is heterogeneity in their sample and the country specific regressions do not 
display the same number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, they use two methods to estimate 
the domestic bloc. In my work, the sample is balanced, which means that there is no need for 
two estimation methods and I use only sequential estimation, that includes only one domestic 
indicator at the time and then estimates the domestic bloc four times per country, once for 
each estimator 
Similarly to Fernandez et al. (2016), I try to reduce the possible issue in estimating the 
combined SVAR equation system, which comes from the small-sample upward bias in the 
estimation of the contribution of world shock to the variance of domestic macroeconomic 
indicators. Statistically the reason behind is that variance is a positive statistic, therefore any 
correlation between commodity prices and macroeconomic indicators results in some 
participation of world shocks in the variance of the macroeconomic indicators itself. This 
would cause problems even if the commodity prices and macroeconomic indicators were 
independent random variables, because the spurious correlation is still present and there will 
be positive share of world shocks in the variance of the macroeconomic variable, which 
would cause an upward bias making the share of world shocks transferred through 
commodity prices overly big.  
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Usually the OLS estimates of SVAR coefficients are biased in a short sample, which can 
cause in turn a bias in the estimated contribution of world shocks to domestic business cycles. 
The more commodity prices are entering in the price vector, the higher is the bias and vice 
versa bias is decreasing together with sample size. (Fernandez et al. 2016)  
In order to correct the small sample bias I perform Monte Carlo experiment by using random 
sampling. The correction is done for every 89 country as follows: the estimates of 𝐹, 𝐺 and 
Σ, denoted by ?̂?, ?̂? and Σ̂ respectively are used to generate artificial time series for 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 
over 250 years. The estimate of the share of the variance of 𝑌𝑡 explained by 𝜇𝑡 is denoted by 
?̂?. Additionally, 𝑇𝑝 denotes the same size of the commodity prices and 𝑇𝑦 the sample size 
of  𝑌𝑡. As I use balanced sample, then both 𝑇
𝑝 and 𝑇𝑦 are set equal to 18. Next, the last 𝑇𝑝 
observations of the artificial time series are used to re-estimate A and Σ𝑡 in the foreign bloc 
and the last 𝑇𝑦 observations to re-estimate 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 and Σ𝜖 in the domestic bloc. This process 
results in an estimate of the matrices𝐹, 𝐺 and Σ from the simulated data, which is used to get 
the share of the variance of 𝑌𝑡 explained by 𝜇𝑡 shocks, denoted by 𝜎. After repeating the 
process for 1,000 times and computing the average estimate of 𝜎, denoted by 𝜎, it is possible 
to define the small-sample bias as 𝜎 − ?̂? and the correct estimate of the share of the variance 
of 𝑌𝑡 explained by 𝜇𝑡 is 2?̂? − 𝜎. (Ibid) 
This paper treats capital controls as exogenous, but identification of the effects of capital 
liberalisation might be distorted because of possible endogeneity. For example capital 
controls may be more likely to occur in good times than in bad, or they are correlated with 
policies that try to enhance the economy. However multiple studies before have found that 
capital controls are in fact exogenous. 
The endogeneity of capital controls have been a problem for several previous studies 
concerning the capital account liberalisation effects on long run growth. Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) tested the likelihood whether banking crises are more likely to occur in 
liberalised financial markets well before 1980, when their data on 53 countries started. They 
used multivariate logit method, where financial liberalisation variable was based on observed 
policy changes. The paper results in finding that financial liberalisation increases the 
probability of a banking crises, but less in a weaker institutional environment. Honig (2008) 
similarly studied the overall effect of financial liberalisation on economic growth and 
followed the logic of previously mentioned Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) when 
choosing an instrument for instrumental variable method. He uses the average level of capital 
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account openness for all countries in a certain region as an instrument in one particular 
country within that region. The explanation behind that is that a decision over opening capital 
accounts in one region influences other policy makers in the region and the likelihood of 
capital account liberalisation increases with the number of countries already adopted the 
policy. This logic is supported by Kose and Prasald (2012), who interpret capital account 
liberalisation as signal of country’s commitment to good economic policies, which shows 
foreign investors stable environment. Therefore capital inflows coming from liberalisation 
should help to transfer of foreign technological skills; encourage competition and financial 
development, thereby promoting growth. 
Several papers use the instrumental variable technique, but it is difficult to find appropriate 
instruments that do not correlate with explanatory variables, but correlate with capital 
controls. Arleta et al. (2001) uses a wide range of variables, that fulfilled the requirement of 
not being correlated with capital controls, for example distance to the equator; the fraction of 
population speaking English or island nation dummy. In order to show exogeneity while 
using more relevant instruments correlating with capital controls, researchers have used 
different indicators based on financial openness or more specific instruments. For example 
Bekaert et al. (2006) used price-earnings ratios of the industries that every country has 
specialised in as an instrument, which in their results exogenously predicts growth. They 
studied the effect that open capital account can have on consumption growth variability, 
finding out that liberalisation can be the reason for lower consumption growth volatility. 
Kraay (1998) studied the reasons for lacking enough empirical evidence in support of free 
capital movement by using lags of financial openness measures as instruments for current 
financial openness. He found little evidence in support of higher volatility among financially 
open economies. Grilli and Milesi-Feretti (1995) support this result and find no evidence of 
a significant effect of share of years over a period during which the capital account was open 
on growth of income per capita. Moreover, Gochoco-Bautista et al. (2010) analysed the 
effectiveness of capital controls in Asia and used the real interest rate differential and the 
second lag of capital flows as an instruments. In both cases they found that none of the capital 
control variables are statistically significant, which means that endogeneity was not present. 
Gruben (2001) used mainly country size variables, for example total GDP in 1980 U.S. 
dollars; total square miles of land and oil exporters. The first test, Hausman-type test raised 
a possibility for endogeneity, even though the capital controls were exogenous. As an 
alternative Gruben (2001) used Sargan instrument validity tests that provides better 
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indication of how capital account liberalisation affects the economy. This test showed that 
capital controls are not determined within the system, meaning they are exogenous. 
 
4. Data 
To study the role that capital controls play in world shocks transmission mechanisms, I use 
the same dataset about commodity prices as Fernandez et al. (2016) and combines it with the 
capital control indices from IMF’s AREAER database, which covers 100 countries over the 
period from 1995 to 2013 and divides capital controls to inflows and outflows; domestic and 
foreign; sales and purchases, allowing to track changes in more granular lever. This dataset 
has used before by Klein et al. (2003); Schindler (2009) as well as Fernandez et al. (2015) 
Because of the restrictions of the availability of data on capital controls the final dataset 
consists of 89 countries instead of initial 139, the period starts in 1995 instead of 1960 and 
lasts until 2013 instead of 2015.  
The capital control indices take value in the range from 0 to 1, where 0 represents no 
restriction and 1 indicates absolute control over capital flows. In order to answer to the 
research question in this master thesis, I divide the sample countries in three capital control 
groups based on the index value as in Klein (2012): 
1. Open countries: 0 – 0.10; 
2. Gate countries: 0.11 – 0.69; 
3. Wall countries: 0.70 – 1. 
Appendix 1 gives the overview of capital controls on inflows and outflows of sample 
countries in these three groups, as well as in income, geographical and trade groups. The 
dataset includes ten countries that have no restriction on capital flows – Denmark, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Zambia, the United Kingdom and 
Uruguay. On the other hand, three countries – Algeria, Sri Lanka and Tunisia – have fully 
restricted capital movements. Almost half of the countries (43) belong to Gate capital control 
group; 32 countries are considered to be Open and only 14 countries are in Wall category. 
This last closed category consists only countries that are in upper-middle (5), lower-middle 
(7) or low income (2) group. In contrast, high income countries are equally divided between 
Open and Gate category (21 in each). Additionally, among Open category, five countries are 
in upper-middle and six in lower-middle income group. There are no low income countries. 
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Whereas in Gate category all the income groups are represented, besides aforementioned 
high income countries, this category consists of 12 upper-middle; 7 lower-middle and 3 low 
income countries.  
Table 2 below shows the descriptive statistics of capital controls. The overall mean value of 
capital control is 0.37 and it can be seen, that the average value of capital outflow index is 
higher than in inflows (0.40 vs 0.35), so countries restrict on average more capital outflow. 
The standard deviation in overall capital outflow is largest in Gate and smallest in Wall 
category, while in Wall countries the standard deviation is the largest on capital inflows. The 
correlation between inflows and outflows is on average 0.34 and it increases with the 
restriction strength on capital movements.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Capital Controls in Capital Control Groups 
 All 
Countries 
Open Gate Wall 
Controls on overall capital flows 
Mean 0.37 0.04 0.45 0.88 
Standard deviation 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.10 
Controls on capital inflows 
Mean 0.35 0.04 0.42 0.80 
Standard deviation 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.20 
Controls on capital outflows 
Mean 0.40 0.04 0.49 0.97 
Standard deviation 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.03 
Correlations between controls on inflows and outflows 0.34 0.20 0.37 0.45 
As this master thesis uses Fernandez et al. (2016) as a basis, then the necessary data about 
world commodity prices and five country specific macroeconomic indicators comes from the 
same source – the World Bank and covers initially 138 countries from 1960 to 2015. The 
sources for five macroeconomic variables – real output, real consumption, real investment, 
the trade balance-to-output ratio and terms of trade – are the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database. GDP, consumption and investment are in local currency units and terms of trade 
are the ratio of trade-weighted export and import unit-value indices. The source for 
commodity prices is the World Bank’s Pink Sheet, where I focus on three aggregate 
commodity price indices – fuel, agriculture, and metals and minerals. The fuel index is a 
weighted average of sport prices of coal, crude oil and natural gas. The agricultural index is 
a weighted average of prices of different beverages (tea, cocoa, coffee), food (fats and oils, 
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grains, and other foods), and agricultural raw materials (timber and other raw materials). The 
price index of metals and minerals is based on the sport prices of aluminium, copper, iron 
ore, lead, nickel, steel, tin, and zinc. All the other goods are interpreted as composite, whose 
price is proxied by the US consumer price index and this composite good is used as 
numeraire. Similarly, these three commodity price indices by the monthly US consumer price 
index and in order to obtain annual time series, the simple average over the twelve months 
of the year is taken. 
Figure 1 shows the movement level and cyclical effects of prices of fuels, metals and 
agricultural commodities giving the picture of the volatility of these prices in more than 50 
years. The agricultural and fuel prices increased a lot in the 1970s, but in 1980s and 1990s 
all three prices have declined. Already in 2000s, all three prices started do increase until 2008, 
when the recession began. 
 
Figure 1. Level and Cyclical Components of Commodity Prices. (Fernandez et al. 2016) 
On the right side of the figure is the cyclical component of the commodity prices captured by 
using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100. Already on the figure above, it can be 
seen that the cyclical components show positive comovement, this is supported by positive 
correlations ranging from 33 to 62.1 (Table 3). The standard deviation of these prices is 
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between 11.2 and 27, and the price of fuel is expectedly the most volatile. Comparing this 
volatility with the volatility of in an average country, then these values are more than three 
times more volatile and when it comes to fuels, then even more than 5.73 times more volatile.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics about World Commodity Prices. 
Statistic pa pm pf r 
Standard deviation 11.2 14.7 27.4 2.16 
Serial correlation 62.3 50.2 50.2 32.23 
Correlation with Agri. 100.0 57.9 46.7 -1.50 
Correlation with Metals 62.1 100.0 33.0 16.21 
Correlation with Fuels 44.4 36.5 100.0 26.91 
Correlation with Interest Rates -4.0 18.0 -31.7 100.00 
Relative Std. Dev to Output 3.1 44.9 5.7 3.66 
The right side of the Appendix 2 gives the full overview of the standard deviation of the 
commodity prices in all countries. This basic overview of data and descriptive statistics give 
the overall understanding of the data and allows to start analysing the data in order to find 
the answer to research questions. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The Role of Capital Controls in the Transmission of Global Shocks 
This subsection presents results about role of capital controls in mediating world shocks to 
business cycles by performing variance decomposition of the SVAR system (Equation 3) 
consisting of foreign and domestic bloc. Firstly, the results are analysed in three capital 
control groups for all countries, then the countries within these groups are divided into 
income groups, trade and based on their geographical location. In order to give a more 
detailed understanding and intuition of the results, the share are presented together with the 
absolute volatility of the same variables. It allows to study the effects of capital account 
liberalisation also in absolute terms. As this paper follows Fernandez et al. (2016), then at 
the end of the section, I present replication of their result with a shorter period and smaller 
number of countries in the next subsection.  
Table 4 left panel presents the shares of variances in output, consumption, investment and 
trade balance to output ratio in domestic business cycles that are explained by world shocks. 
It can be seen from looking at the whole sample group that on average the world shocks are 
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estimated to explain 35.5% of business cycles fluctuations in domestic output, about 25% of 
the variances in consumption and investments and 18.6% in trade balance to output ratio.  
Table 4. Share of Variance Explained by World Shocks Mediating through Commodity 
Prices in Capital Control Groups and the Absolute Volatilities of Macroeconomic Variables 
Capital 
Control 
Group 
Group 
Size 
Share of Variance 
Explained by World 
Shocks (%) 
Median Absolute 
Deviation (%) 
Absolute volatility (%) 
Y C I TBY Y C I TBY Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 34.4 3.8 8.1 9.9 6.11 4.26 11.0 8.54 
Open 32 34.4 19.2 27.8 19.6 13.9 12.0 19.6 11.0 4.97 3.41 9.18 6.96 
Gate 43 38.5 27.6 32.2 12.9 20.7 19.7 11.5 11.5 6.32 4.32 11.9 9.03 
Wall 14 23.6 20.9 20.3 24.9 18.4 9.5 6.6 8.8 8.08 6.01 12.9 10.6 
Table 4 shows that the global shocks explain the largest share of variance in domestic 
business cycles in Gate capital control group, whereas the smallest share of variance is 
explained in Wall country group. This means that if country imposes capital controls with an 
intention to protect themselves from larger fluctuations in output coming from international 
economy, then this measure works. Global shocks only explain 23.6% of the variance in 
output in domestic business cycles among Wall countries. The fact that global shocks explain 
less variation in closed countries aligns with the findings of Ostry et al. (2010), who 
concluded while analysing capital inflows to emerging markets, that countries who had 
capital controls in place before the global crises of 2007 and 2008 suffered smaller output 
declines.  
Similarly, the world shocks explain the most in consumption among Gate countries – 27.6% 
of the variance – and the less in Open group (19.2%), even though comparing with Wall 
countries, the difference is not big – there the variance is 20.9%. Studying the absolute 
volatilities that world shocks can cause in consumption in Gate (1.3%) and Wall (1.2%) 
countries, then the difference are not that big because of the high volatility in Wall countries. 
Investment is most affected by world shocks in Gate countries, where the value is 
considerably higher than in overall average – 32.9%; in Open countries it is 27.8%, being 
about two percent points higher than in baseline group, whereas in Wall countries world 
shocks explain only 20.9% of the variance in investment in domestic business cycles.  
On the contrary, global shocks influence more trade in Wall countries, where world shocks 
cause 2.6% of absolute volatility in trade balance to output ratio, whereas in Open countries 
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the world shocks cause 1.4% of the absolute volatility. This is interesting under the light of 
the results by Tamirisa (1999), who concluded that capital controls reduce exports only to 
transition and developing countries, but the effect on developed and industrialised countries 
is minimalised. Here this could mean that the data includes a number of developed countries 
that have imposed capital control, as the global shocks are able to explain the changes in trade 
in closed countries.  
The middle panel of Table 4 gives the median absolute deviation (MAD), helping to estimate 
how spread the values are without being affected by the outliers. The baseline value of output 
– 34.4% shows that output level of the countries included varies across countries, whereas 
MAD of consumption is only 3.8% in the baseline group. In capital control groups, Gate 
countries have the highest MAD, the output values deviate there 20.7% and in consumption 
19.7% and in trade 11.5%. There MAD values in trade across capital control groups deviate 
the less. In investment group, Open group has the highest deviation measured by MAD. One 
possible reason for MAD to be the highest in Gate group is that it includes countries with 
capital controls ranging from 0.11 to 0.69, where countries with extreme values could have 
very different development level.  
Table 4 right panel presents absolute volatilites of the same four indicators in the three capital 
control groups. As expected, investment is on average the most volatile component, followed 
by trade, output and consumption. The right side of the table shows that, the volatility 
decreases when countries have less capital controls – the Wall countries have the highest and 
Open group the lowest volatilities. Taking into account the absolute volatility of output in 
these country groups, the differences in the absolute variance that the world shocks generate 
are small, but nevertheless Gate countries remain to be the strongest affected by the world 
shocks, generating 2.4% of absolute volatility compared to 1.9% in Wall and 1.7% in Gate 
countries. 
Table 5 allows to look at the distribution of capital control groups in three income groups 
(lower and low are aggregated together). Higher income also indicates the development level 
of a country – lower income countries are still emerging while higher income group includes 
already industrialised countries. Therefore it is possible to detect possible connections 
between capital controls and the effects of global shocks in different income groups.  
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Table 5. Share of Variance Explained by World Shocks in Income Groups 
Specification 
Group 
Size 
Share of Variance Explained by World Shocks (%) 
Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 
High Income 42 34.7 26.5 31.3 17.2 
 Open 21 35.6 24.8 30.0 20.6 
Gate 21 26.9 27.2 36.4 12.9 
 Wall - - - - - 
Upper-Middle Income 22 39.3 23.2 23.9 23.0 
 
Open 5 23.5 19.4 46.8 18.2 
Gate 12 44.1 27.4 29.1 31.4 
Wall 5 26.0 17.0 20.0 22.9 
Lower-Middle Income 20 38.2 19.8 20.2 24.9 
Low Income 5 36.4 19.7 39.5 24.6 
 
Open 6 16.9 9.2 6.2 23.9 
Gate 10 56.6 33.4 24.3 11.0 
Wall 9 21.2 23.8 20.6 26.8 
 
This table shows how in high income groups, there are countries that are Open or Gate, 
whereas the majority of Wall countries belong to lower income groups. The same was found 
by Grilli and Milesi-Feretti (1995), that capital controls are more used in countries with lower 
incomes, as they are seen as protective measure. They add to list also large government and 
a central bank with limited independence.  
The share of variance explained by world shocks in output does not vary across income 
groups, being roughly between 35 and 39%, therefore the main results are not due to the fact 
that rich economies are open and poor are mainly closed. This shows that the hypothesis that 
capital account openness makes output more volatile due to the specialization does not hold 
here. Whereas on income levels, the wealthier the country is, the bigger share of variance is 
explained by the world shocks in consumption and the smaller share in trade balance to output 
ratio. Meaning the poorer the country, the more their trade balance to output ratio is 
influenced by the shocks in global economy. Countries’ investments do not have so concrete 
directions: it can be said that the share of variance explained by world shocks decreases 
together with the income level of a country, but the poorest countries have almost extremely 
higher share of variance explained by global shocks – 39.5%. This exceeds the overall 
average value by 14.1 percentage points and high income group by 8.2 percentage points.  
Table 5 shows that none of the countries with high income are completely closed in terms of 
capital controls and there are differences between Open and Gate countries in mediating the 
effects of global shocks to domestic business cycles. In the Open countries, the world shocks 
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influence more output and trade: the world shocks explain 35.6% and 20.6% of the variance 
in output and balance to output ratio respectively and these shares are about 8 percentage 
points higher than in Gate countries. Whereas among Gate countries the shares of variances 
explained by world shocks are 27.2% of consumption and 36.4% of investments. The 
difference with Open countries is less than three and more than six percentage points 
respectively. 
Looking at upper-middle income group, the first thing to point out is that in output, 
consumption and trade balance to output ratio the share of variance explained by global 
shocks is considerably higher than in other capital control groups, especially in Gate countries 
global shocks explain 44.1% in output, which is around 20 percentage points higher than in 
other capital control groups. Similarly are consumption and trade balance-to-output ratio 
around ten percentage points higher in Gate group than in Open or Wall. Only the share of 
variance explained by global shocks in investments is higher in Open countries – 46.8%, 
which besides exceeding the values of other groups, is almost two times as high as in baseline.  
Klein (2003) studied the experiences of different countries with capital account opening and 
he found that it has a U-shaped relationship with income per capita, which means that middle 
income countries benefit significantly more from capital account openness than poor or rich 
countries. Here, as upper-middle income group is on average across income groups the most 
dependent on global shocks. This can mean that during the good times, these countries can 
enjoy good economic climate, whereas if something happens in global economy, then they 
are the first ones to be influenced. 
The shares vary between capital controls more among lower income countries – for example, 
in Gate countries the share of variance in output is as high as 56.6%; in consumption it is 
33.4% and in investments 24.3%. All these values are more than three times higher than in 
open countries. In low income group trade balance to output ratio is almost equally influenced 
by world shocks in Wall and Open countries, where the share of variance is close to 25%.  
In Appendix 3, right-side panel of Table A1 shows the absolute volatility in income groups 
and the tendency that poorer countries with capital controls are more volatile, than countries 
in higher income groups and allow for capital movement. – the standard deviation of output 
in low income group and Wall countries is 8.6%, whereas the overall average on baseline 
level is 3.7%. Looking at absolute volatilities, then the in high income group Gate countries 
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are more influenced by the world shocks than open countries, as the world shocks generate 
respectively 1.4% and 1.2% of absolute volatility in output. In upper-middle income group 
world shocks generate 3.1% of absolute volatility in output among Gate countries, whereas 
in low income group among Gate countries world shocks generate 3.6% of absolute volatility 
in output. The left-side panel shows the MAD-s in income groups. Interestingly, within 
capital control groups the deviation of output is smaller than in baseline group. In 
consumption, Gate countries have larger deviation in all three income groups, whereas Open 
and Wall countries are only slightly higher than the overall baseline value. Trade balance to 
output ratio deviates the most among Gate countries in upper-middle income group, but stays 
around 10% like in baseline.  
After analysing the role of capital controls in overall level and across income group, it can 
be said that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between capital account openness and 
country’s acceptance to global shocks through commodity prices. Global shocks explain 
bigger share of variance among Gate countries with some exceptions in trade balance to 
output ratio. As several researchers have found that countries with better legal system, good 
institutions and favourable conditions for foreign investment, and investor protection 
generate larger growth effects from financial liberalisation (Bekaert et al. (2005) and Prasad 
et al. (2013)) Therefore one possible explanation for Gate countries to be the most effected 
by international markets is that they are attractive enough for capital inflows, but at the same 
time their legal and institutional development is still fragile to be hit by the changes in global 
markets. Whereas Open countries have strong institutional background and Wall countries 
are not that dependent on international markets.  
Next I consider the role of capital controls through different trade groups as trade is highly 
dependent on global markets and assumed to have a substantial influence on capital flows. 
Moreover, looking at Table 6 can help to confirm or refute my theory that the relationship 
between capital account openness and share of variance explained by global shocks. 
Looking at the pattern in Table 6 shows that global shocks explain the largest share in output, 
consumption and investment among commodity and oil exporters in Gate countries. In some 
cases the largest share explained in output or consumption is among Wall or Open countries, 
but the difference with Gate countries is small – only 1 or 2 percentages. Trade balance to 
output ratio is the most influenced by global shocks in Open capital control group if I consider 
only exporters and in Wall group considering commodity and oil importers. 
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Table 6. Share of Variance and Explained by World Shocks in Trade Divisions.  
Specification Group Size 
Share of Variance Explained by World Shocks (%) 
Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 
Net Commodity          
Exporters 31 25.6 27.1 22.4 28.5 
 Open 9 13.7 16.3 17.6 30.3 
 Gate 18 44.0 47.4 26.7 30.3 
  Wall 4 16.5 26.2 23.6 25.7 
Importers 56 36.0 23.2 28.7 15.7 
 Open 23 35.6 24.8 30.4 17.4 
 Gate 24 35.5 23.2 30.7 11.9 
  Wall 9 37.9 20.8 18.9 22.9 
Oil Trade     
Exporters 21 26.0 32.2 21.1 32.2 
 Open 5 13.7 18.7 6.1 35.3 
 Gate 13 54.2 55.3 21.2 32.6 
  Wall 3 2.9 21.0 17.4 22.9 
Importers 66 35.6 23.8 28.7 16.7 
 Open 27 35.6 19.4 30.0 18.2 
 Gate 29 34.6 26.6 33.9 12.8 
  Wall 10 29.5 22.3 22.7 24.9 
Excluding Large Commodity      
Exporters 50 33.7 23.8 20.9 15.9 
 Open 13 25.5 19.0 12.5 23.2 
 Gate 26 39.4 27.4 25.1 11.8 
  Wall 11 21.2 20.8 20.0 26.8 
Furthermore, net commodity and oil importers have similar shares explained by world shocks 
and in turn exporters resemble to each other. For example among Gate countries the share of 
variance in consumption explained by global shocks in domestic business cycles is as high 
as 47.4% in net commodity exporters and 55.3% in oil exporters. The share of variance in 
output in exporters in Gate countries is also higher than 50%, while in Wall countries it is 
only 2.9%. While GDP and consumption are more influenced by global shocks than the 
average baseline value, then in investment in all three capital control groups, the world shock 
explain around 20–25% of the variance in net commodity and oil exporters, only for oil 
exporters in Open group global shocks only explain 6.1% of the variance in domestic 
business cycles.  
The importers among commodity and oil traders are more stable, and it is hard to draw out 
extreme values. The share of variance in output explained by world shocks is in both 
commodity and oil importers around 35% and in consumption around 20–25%. The values 
differ more, if investments and trade balance-to-output ratio are considered. In both, 
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commodity and oil importers, Open and Gate countries’ investments are more affected by 
world shocks than in Wall countries. There the share of variance explained by global shocks 
is among importers around 20%, while the share of variance in investment explained by 
world shocks is among Open and Gate countries commodity and oil importers is more than 
30%. The Wall countries trade balance-to-output ratio is the most affected by global shocks 
– the share of variance is there in both import groups a little bit less than 25%, while in Gate 
countries it is slightly higher than 10%.  
As the export countries’ the results vary, then the union of 30 biggest exporters in every 
commodity exporter is excluded. In the remaining 50 countries, the global shocks explain the 
largest amount of variance in output, consumption and investment in Gate countries – 39.4%; 
27.4% and 25.1% of the variance respectively. In Wall countries the domestic business cycles 
are influenced by world shocks the most – 26.8% of the variance is explained there. 
Excluding large commodity exporters lowers the share of variances when comparing the 
commodity and oil exporters, raising the theory that export countries are more influenced by 
global shocks as exporting comes with higher risks as countries need to sell their goods and 
services on foreign markets, whereas importing is just meeting the demand that the country 
itself cannot satisfy 
The panel on the right in Table A2, Appendix 3, shows the absolute volatilities in trade 
groups. Considering separately exporters and importers, then actually in commodity 
exporters among Gate and Wall countries, the world shocks generate 2.8% of absolute 
volatility in trade balance to output ratio, while in Wall countries the world shocks generate 
only 2.3% of the absolute volatility. Similarly, the world shocks influence the most Gate 
among oil exporters, where they generate 3.2% of the absolute volatility, whereas among 
Open countries they generate 2.6% of absolute volatility. On the contrary to absolute 
volatility, in trade groups it is impossible to draw out a pattern, where the shares of variances 
are deviated the most by looking at the MAD. The MAD value is smaller than baseline group 
across capital control groups in different trade divisions in output and exceeds the baseline 
value among other macroeconomic variables.  
Looking the countries in different geographical regions can give assurance that the 
development level matters when analysing the role of capital controls in transmission of 
shocks, as countries with similar development level are usually gathered in the same region. 
Table 7 shows countries and capital control categories in five geographical groups: East Asia, 
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South Asia and Pacific; Europe, Central Asia and North America; Latin America and 
Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; and finally Sub-Saharan Africa.  
First looking at groups, which consist of more developed countries with higher income, then 
even the distribution of capital control groups is the same and among Europe, Central Asia 
and North America all the countries belong to Open or Gate countries. The share of variances 
in this regional group also resemble the results of earlier showed high income group. 
Similarly, the tendency, that Gate countries are more affected by world shocks continues and 
the share of variance explained in trade balance to output ratio is higher among countries 
with open capital control policy. 
Table 7. Share of Variance and Explained by World Shocks in Geographical Regions. 
Specification 
Group 
Size 
Share of Variance Explained by World Shocks 
(%) 
Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 
East Asia, South Asia & Pacific  16 35.3 19.9 30.9 18.1 
 Open 4 37.8 21.6 31.4 16.2 
 Gate 6 29.8 11.5 29.5 18.8 
 Wall 6 42.6 26.9 28.8 22.9 
Europe, Central Asia & North 
America 
28 38.9 27.4 28.0 12.3 
 Open 15 36.6 21.6 30.4 22.8 
 Gate 13 40.3 27.2 36.4 11.7 
 Wall - - - - - 
Latin America & Caribbean 17 25.5 26.8 21.1 17.4 
 Open 8 24.5 14.2 16.5 16.7 
 Gate 9 49.0 27.7 21.1 18.8 
 Wall - - - - - 
Middle East & North Africa 14 38.9 27.4 28.0 12.3 
 Open 3 13.7 18.7 6.1 35.3 
 Gate 8 29.5 30.1 44.0 20.3 
 Wall 3 1.1 10.2 17.4 27.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 39.1 29.0 26.1 26.7 
 Open 2 47.3 11.7 60.1 26.7 
 Gate 7 54.0 34.4 27.4 15.7 
  Wall 5 21.2 14.8 20.0 35.2 
The share of variances explained by global shocks in East and South Asia and Pacific 
resemble quantitatively also countries with higher income, even though Gate countries are 
not influenced by the world shocks the most, but Wall countries are in output, consumption 
and trade balance to output ratio, whereas share of variance in investment is the highest in 
Open capital control group, but the differences with Gate and Wall groups are only couple of 
percentage points. 
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On the contrary, even though none of the countries in Latin America and Caribbean region 
belong to Wall capital control group, the shares of variances resemble more to countries with 
lower income. The share of variance in output explained by world shocks in Gate countries 
is almost 50%, in consumption it is around 30% and in investment and trade balance to output 
ration around 20%. These magnitudes are the same as in lower income group.   
In case Middle East and North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa it is hard to draw any parallels 
with specific income groups as the shares of variance deviate largely within one group. One 
of the possible reasons for that is that three capital control groups are not distributed equally 
inside a group, for example Open and Wall capital control groups in Middle East and North 
Africa region consist of three countries, while in Sub-Saharan Africa there are only two 
countries in Open group. The world shocks in these three Wall countries in Middle East and 
North Africa region have basically no effect on the output share of variance in domestic 
business cycle. This shows if that has been the intention, then capital controls have been 
effective.  
In Middle East and North Africa, world shocks do not influence that much of the domestic 
markets, because the share of variance in output in Gate countries is only 29.5%, being 
around five percentage points less than baseline value. The other variables like consumption, 
investment and trade balance to output ratio are considerably higher than baseline value. 
World shocks explain 44% of the variance in investment in Gate countries and in Wall 
countries world shocks explain 35.3% of the variance in trade balance to output ratio.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 35% of the variance in trade balance to output ratio is explained by 
global shocks. Overall in Sub-Saharan Africa, the largest shares of variances are exceeding 
the baseline values even more than two times. For example share of variance explained by 
world shocks in investment in Open group is as high as 60.1% or in output among Gate 
countries 54%. On the other side, the shares of variances in consumption among Open and 
Wall countries are as little as 10%, which is 15 percentage points less than the baseline value.  
Appendix 3, Table A3 shows the MADS and absolute volatilities in regional groups. Even 
though that in East Asia, South Asia and Pacific group global shocks explain among three 
capital control group almost the same amount of variance in investment, then looking at the 
absolute volatilities the result is different. In Gate countries world shocks generate 3.7% of 
absolute volatility in investment, while in Open countries world shocks generate only 2.3% 
of absolute volatility. Looking at MAD, it can be said similarly as in trade groups, that there 
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hard to detect one pattern and the regions are deviated differently, even though Wall countries 
are across all groups the less deviated.  
All in all, looking the role of capital controls in different groups has shown, that Gate 
countries are the most influenced by global shocks in output, consumption and investments, 
while global shocks explain more of the variance in trade balance to output ratio among   
 
5.2. Comparison with Fernandez et al. (2016) 
As this master thesis uses Fernadez et al. (2016) article as a basis, but focuses on capital 
controls, then I also show the results after estimating the blocs described in the method part 
of the thesis.   
The country-specific, domestic bloc is estimated by using sequential estimation. Table 8 
gathers the overall results of variance decomposition country by country. It shows cross-
country median shares of the variances of output, consumption, investment and the trade 
balance-to-output ratio explained by world shocks mediated by commodity prices4. Appendix 
6 has the results country by country in both corrected and noncorrected version.   
Table 8. Share of Variances Explained by World Shocks and Mediated by Commodity Prices 
in two different datasets. 
 
 Fernandez et al. (2016)  
130 countries in 1960-2015 (%) 
This paper 
89 countries in 1995-2013 (%) 
Sequential Estimation y c i tby y c i tby 
Noncorrected estimate 43.9 33.9 33.8 29.3 44.7 35.9 36.9 31.1 
Small-Sample Bias 9.8 12.6 12.2 13.3 10.2 13.0 12.1 13.0 
Corrected estimate 34.1 21.3 21.6 16.0 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 
MAD of Corrected estimate 19.7 15.9 15.4 14.5 18.6 13.9 16.6 15.3 
Source: Fernandez et al. (2016) and author’s calculations using the replication files. 
The corrected estimate of sequential estimation shows that world shocks explain 35.5% of 
variance in output. 24.8% of variance in consumption. 25.4% of variance in investment, and 
18.6% of variance in trade balance-to-output ratio. The estimated contribution of world 
shocks varies strongly across 89 countries, because the median absolute value of the corrected 
value is 18.6%, which means that the share of variance of output can range in an interval with 
length of almost 20 percentage points. Comparing the results with the original Fernandez et 
al. (2016) results, then the estimates are slightly larger, as the number of countries has 
                                                 
4 Corrected estimate is achieved after removing the small sample bias through Monte Carlo method 
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decreased – in the replicated article they had 138 countries. Also the time span in this article 
is not equalised across the countries, the longest sample period is 55 year (1960–2014) and 
shortest 25 years. In this master thesis the time period is equally from 1995–2013 across the 
89 countries.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper analyses the role of capital control on transferring the global shocks through 
commodity prices on domestic business cycle through commodity prices. More specifically, 
I have studied the effect that global shocks have on the shares of variances in output, 
consumption, investment and trade balance to output ratio from 1995 to 2013 in 89 developed 
and developing countries.  
The main result is that capital controls have a role in mediating the international shocks to 
domestic business cycles in macroeconomic indicators like output, consumption and 
investment. Comparing the shares of variances that global shocks explain in domestic 
business cycles shows that they are the lowest in output, consumption and investment among 
Wall countries. The only variable that is explained more by global shocks among Wall 
countries is trade balance to output ratio. Moreover, I conclude that capital account openness 
and country’s acceptance to global shocks through commodity prices has an inverse U-
shaped relationship, meaning that the global shocks explain the largest share of variance in 
domestic business cycles in countries that belong to Gate countries, and less in Open and 
Wall countries.  
Interestingly, there are substantial differences in trade groups between commodity and oil 
importers and exporters, where export is more influenced on domestic markets by global 
shocks. After excluding the biggest exporters, the shares of variances explained by world 
shocks are lower indicating that the possible reason for exporters being more dependent on 
fluctuations on international markets is that selling abroad has higher risk than in domestic 
market, making the export more sensitive.  
This paper finds out on average through sub-divisions that the Gate countries are the most 
affected by global shocks and one reason may be in data, as almost half of the countries 
belong to Gate capital control group, which ranges from 0.11 until 0.69. For further 
development, the same issue could be analysed in different framework, meaning using other 
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division of capital control group or even using totally different measure of capital account 
openness.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Sample Countries in Capital Control Groups (1995-2011).  
Sample Countries (1995-2011) Trade Groups Capital Controls 
Country Income Group Geographic Group Net Commodity Oil Overall Inflows Outflows 
OPEN - 32 countries 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Austria High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.10 0.00 0.20 
Belgium High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.07 0.00 0.13 
Canada High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Export 0.09 0.17 0.00 
Costa Rica Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.02 0.04 0.00 
Denmark High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Egypt. Arab Rep. Lower-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Export 0.08 0.02 0.13 
El Salvador Lower-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.08 0.11 0.06 
Finland High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.03 0.07 0.00 
France High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.12 0.06 0.18 
Greece High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.04 0.01 0.06 
Guatemala Lower-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hong Kong SAR. China High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ireland High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.04 0.00 0.09 
Japan High Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Mauritius Upper-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.10 0.20 0.00 
Netherlands High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Import 0.09 0.17 0.00 
Nicaragua Lower-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.01 0.03 0.00 
Norway High Europe. Central Asia and North America  Export Export 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oman High Latin America & Caribbean Export Export 0.10 0.20 0.00 
Panama Upper-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix 1 continues. 
Country Income Group Geographic Group 
Net 
Commodity 
Oil Overall Inflows Outflows 
Paraguay Upper-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.04 0.02 0.05 
Peru Upper-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Export Import 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Singapore High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.09 0.00 0.18 
Spain High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Sweden High Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.03 0.05 0.00 
Zambia Lower-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Export Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
United Kingdom High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
United States High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.09 0.00 0.18 
Uruguay High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Yemen Lower-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Export Export 0.08 0.16 0.00 
GATE - 43 countries 0.45 0.43 0.49 
Argentina High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.54 0.48 0.68 
Australia High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.30 0.28 0.32 
Bahrain High Middle East & North-Africa Export Import 0.31 0.41 0.21 
Bangladesh Lower-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.68 0.66 0.70 
Bolivia Lower-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Export 0.32 0.39 0.26 
Brazil Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.64 0.62 0.67 
Bulgaria Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.18 0.14 0.22 
Burkina Faso Low Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Import 0.68 0.39 0.97 
Chile High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Import 0.44 0.45 0.44 
Colombia Upper-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Export Export 0.69 0.62 0.76 
Czech Republic High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.30 0.10 0.50 
Cyprus High Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.50 0.41 0.58 
Dominican Republic Upper-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.30 0.34 0.27 
Ecuador Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Export 0.30 0.23 0.37 
Ethiopia Low Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.68 0.65 0.71 
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Appendix 1 continues. 
Country 
Income 
Group 
Geographic Group 
Net 
Commodity 
Oil Overall Inflows 
Outflo
ws 
Germany High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.31 0.26 0.35 
Ghana Lower-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.69 0.80 0.58 
Hungary High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.31 0.22 0.41 
Iceland High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Import 0.32 0.31 0.33 
Indonesia Lower-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Export Export 0.49 0.67 0.31 
Iran. Islamic Rep. Upper-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Export Export 0.69 0.68 0.70 
Israel High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.30 0.28 0.33 
Kenya Lower-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.38 0.43 0.33 
Korea. Rep. High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.37 0.37 0.36 
Kuwait High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.35 0.38 0.32 
Lebanon Upper-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Malta High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.44 0.41 0.48 
Mexico Upper-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.60 0.45 0.75 
Myanmar Lower-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa - - 0.69 0.60 0.77 
Nigeria Lower-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.35 0.38 0.33 
Poland High Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.37 0.33 0.42 
Portugal High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.35 0.33 0.37 
Romania Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.40 0.30 0.50 
Russian Federation High Latin America & Caribbean Export Export 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Saudi Arabia High Latin America & Caribbean Export Export 0.55 0.63 0.47 
Slovenia High Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.42 0.44 0.40 
South Africa Upper-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Export Import 0.64 0.44 0.84 
Switzerland High Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Thailand Upper-Middle Latin America & Caribbean Import Import 0.70 0.61 0.79 
Turkey Upper-Middle Europe. Central Asia and North America   Import Import 0.35 0.20 0.50 
Uganda Low Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.40 0.20 0.59 
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Appendix 1 continues.  
Country Income Group Geographic Group 
Net 
Commodity 
Oil Overall Inflows Outflows 
United Arab Emirates High East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.31 0.37 0.24 
Venezuela. RB High Europe. Central Asia and North America   Export Export 0.37 0.48 0.27 
WALL - 14 countries 0.88 0.80 0.97 
Algeria Upper-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa Export Export 1.00 1.00 0.99 
Angola Upper-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa - - 0.96 1.00 0.92 
China Upper-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.98 1.00 0.96 
Cote d'Ivoire Lower-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Import 0.84 0.70 0.97 
India Lower-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 0.92 0.90 0.94 
Malaysia Upper-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Export 0.84 0.69 0.99 
Morocco Lower-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.79 0.64 0.97 
Pakistan Lower-Middle East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.73 0.50 0.96 
Philippines Lower-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.76 0.53 1.00 
Sri Lanka Lower-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Import 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Swaziland Lower-Middle Sub-Saharan Africa Import Import 0.78 0.66 0.89 
Tanzania Low East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Import Import 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Togo Low East Asia. South-Asia & Pacific   Export Import 0.80 0.60 1.00 
Tunisia Upper-Middle Middle East & North-Africa Import Export 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overall average 0.38 0.35 0.40 
Overall median 0.32 0.33 0.33 
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Appendix 2. Standard Deviation of Sample Countries Macroeconomic Variables and Commodity prices.  
Country 
Capital 
Control Group 
Income   
Group 
Std of Macroeconomic Variables  Std. Dev (p)/ Std. Dev (GDP) 
(GDP) (C) (I) (TBY) pA pM pF r 
Baseline 0.061 0.043 0.111 0.085 0.11 0.15 0.27 0.02 
Argentina Gate High 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.09 4.10 5.95 7.58 0.48 
Australia Gate High 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.05 1.30 1.89 2.41 0.15 
Bahrain Gate High 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.07 1.78 2.58 3.28 0.21 
Bangladesh Gate Lower-Middle 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.10 7.79 11.29 14.39 0.92 
Bolivia Gate Lower-Middle 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.10 7.81 11.33 14.44 0.92 
Brazil Gate Upper-Middle 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.07 5.09 7.39 9.42 0.60 
Bulgaria Gate Upper-Middle 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.09 14.59 21.16 26.97 1.72 
Burkina Faso Gate Low 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.15 7.86 11.40 14.53 0.93 
Chile Gate High 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.08 4.01 5.81 7.41 0.47 
Colombia Gate Upper-Middle 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.08 3.51 5.09 6.49 0.41 
Cyprus Gate High 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.05 1.79 2.59 3.30 0.21 
Czech Republic Gate High 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.07 4.47 6.48 8.26 0.53 
Dominican Republic Gate Upper-Middle 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.08 5.40 7.83 9.99 0.64 
Ecuador Gate Upper-Middle 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.08 2.12 3.08 3.93 0.25 
Ethiopia Gate Low 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.14 3.53 5.12 6.53 0.42 
Germany Gate High 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 4.40 6.39 8.14 0.52 
Ghana Gate Lower-Middle 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.14 3.56 5.17 6.59 0.42 
Hungary Gate High 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.06 2.70 3.91 4.99 0.32 
Iceland Gate High 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.06 4.33 6.28 8.00 0.51 
Indonesia Gate Lower-Middle 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.10 2.94 4.26 5.43 0.35 
Iran. Islamic Rep. Gate Upper-Middle 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.12 5.99 8.69 11.08 0.71 
Israel Gate High 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.06 3.63 5.26 6.71 0.43 
Kenya Gate Lower-Middle 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.11 3.73 5.42 6.90 0.44 
Korea. Rep. Gate High 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 3.96 5.75 7.32 0.47 
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Appendix 2 continues. 
Country  
Capital 
Control Group 
Income 
Group 
GDP  C I TBY pA pM pF r 
Kuwait Gate High 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.12 2.76 4.00 5.10 0.33 
Lebanon Gate Upper-Middle 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.15 2.20 3.20 4.07 0.26 
Malta Gate High 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.05 3.27 4.74 6.04 0.39 
Mexico Gate Upper-Middle 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.08 7.76 11.25 14.34 0.92 
Myanmar Gate Lower-Middle 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.16 6.11 8.86 11.30 0.72 
Nigeria Gate Lower-Middle 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.12 3.67 5.33 6.79 0.43 
Poland Gate High 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 2.99 4.33 5.52 0.35 
Portugal Gate High 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.07 4.61 6.69 8.52 0.54 
Romania Gate Upper-Middle 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.09 3.32 4.81 6.13 0.39 
Russian Federation Gate High 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.11 3.13 4.54 5.78 0.37 
Saudi Arabia Gate High 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.11 3.21 4.66 5.94 0.38 
Slovenia Gate High 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05 6.05 8.78 11.19 0.71 
South Africa Gate Upper-Middle 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 2.72 3.94 5.02 0.32 
Switzerland Gate High 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 1.46 2.12 2.70 0.17 
Togo Gate Low 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.16 3.28 4.76 6.07 0.39 
Uganda Gate Low 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.14 4.41 6.40 8.15 0.52 
United Arab Emirates Gate High 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.09 6.67 9.67 12.33 0.79 
United Kingdom Gate High 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 5.54 8.04 10.24 0.65 
Yemen. Rep. Gate Lower-Middle 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.11 4.71 6.82 8.70 0.56 
Austria Open High 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 4.02 5.83 7.43 0.47 
Belgium Open High 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.76 1.11 1.41 0.09 
Canada Open High 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 1.07 1.55 1.97 0.13 
Costa Rica Open Upper-Middle 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.08 3.49 5.06 6.45 0.41 
Denmark Open High 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 4.52 6.56 8.36 0.53 
Egypt. Arab Rep. Open Lower-Middle 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.08 5.32 7.72 9.83 0.63 
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Appendix 2 continues 
Country  
Capital 
Control Group 
Income 
Group 
GDP  C I TBY pA pM pF r 
El Salvador Open Lower-Middle 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.11 3.29 4.77 6.08 0.39 
Finland Open High 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 4.57 6.63 8.45 0.54 
France Open High 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 2.10 3.04 3.88 0.25 
Greece Open High 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.07 6.07 8.80 11.22 0.72 
Guatemala Open Lower-Middle 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.10 4.43 6.43 8.19 0.52 
Hong Kong SAR Open High 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 2.21 3.21 4.09 0.26 
Ireland Open High 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 2.38 3.45 4.40 0.28 
Italy Open High 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 5.50 7.98 10.17 0.65 
Japan Open High 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 4.03 5.85 7.45 0.48 
Mauritius Open Upper-Middle 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08 5.93 8.61 10.97 0.70 
Netherlands Open High 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 2.38 3.46 4.41 0.28 
New Zealand Open High 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 2.64 3.83 4.88 0.31 
Nicaragua Open Lower-Middle 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.12 2.38 3.46 4.41 0.28 
Norway Open High 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 3.17 4.60 5.86 0.37 
Oman Open High 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.08 2.97 4.30 5.48 0.35 
Panama Open Upper-Middle 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 3.89 5.64 7.19 0.46 
Paraguay Open Upper-Middle 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.11 1.80 2.61 3.32 0.21 
Peru Open Upper-Middle 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.12 1.45 2.10 2.68 0.17 
Singapore Open High 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.07 2.07 3.00 3.82 0.24 
Spain Open High 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.06 3.19 4.63 5.90 0.38 
Sweden Open High 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 2.53 3.67 4.68 0.30 
Tanzania Open Low 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.13 5.37 7.78 9.92 0.63 
United States Open High 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 3.99 5.79 7.38 0.47 
Uruguay Open High 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.08 3.69 5.35 6.82 0.44 
Venezuela. RB Open High 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.09 3.08 4.47 5.69 0.36 
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Appendix 2 continues.  
Country  
Capital 
Control Group 
Income 
Group 
GDP  C I TBY pA pM pF r 
Zambia Open Lower-Middle 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.12 5.25 7.62 9.71 0.62 
Algeria Wall Upper-Middle 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 5.23 7.59 9.67 0.62 
Angola Wall Upper-Middle 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.10 5.35 7.77 9.90 0.63 
China Wall Upper-Middle 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.09 2.71 3.93 5.00 0.32 
Cote d'Ivoire Wall Lower-Middle 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.12 2.23 3.23 4.12 0.26 
India Wall Lower-Middle 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.09 5.62 8.16 10.39 0.66 
Malaysia Wall Upper-Middle 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 2.88 4.18 5.32 0.34 
Morocco Wall Lower-Middle 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.09 3.75 5.44 6.93 0.44 
Pakistan Wall Lower-Middle 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.10 1.61 2.33 2.97 0.19 
Philippines Wall Lower-Middle 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.09 5.08 7.36 9.38 0.60 
Sri Lanka Wall Lower-Middle 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.13 5.83 8.46 10.78 0.69 
Swaziland Wall Lower-Middle 0.11 0.08 0.19 0.17 2.22 3.22 4.10 0.26 
Thailand Wall Upper-Middle 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.14 1.84 2.67 3.40 0.22 
Tunisia Wall Upper-Middle 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.10 3.86 5.60 7.13 0.46 
Turkey Wall Upper-Middle 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.11 3.40 4.94 6.29 0.40 
Relative Standard Deviation (Std. Dev(p)/Mean(StdDev(GDP))) 3.10 4.49 5.73 0.37 
Median 3.63 5.26 6.71 0.43 
 
 
Appendix 3. Absolute Volatilities of Macroeconomic Variables  
Table A1. Median Absolute Deviation and Absolute Volatilities in Income Groups 
Specification 
Group 
Size 
Median Absolute Deviation (%) Absolute volatility (%) 
Y C I TBY Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 34.4 3.8 8.1 9.9 3.71 3.27 12.20 8.21 
High Income 42 13.1 10.5 14.5 13.0 3.55 3.13 11.70 5.57 
 Open 21 10.8 9.0 15.8 14.8 3.37 2.51 7.00 5.06 
Gate 21 14.6 20.2 17.9 10.3 5.27 3.56 9.99 7.06 
 Wall - - - -  - - - - 
Upper-Middle Income 22 18.3 6.2 15.6 12.8 4.42 3.89 12.81 9.90 
 
Open 5 11.3 7.3 15.2 5.0 6.63 4.52 11.41 9.18 
Gate 12 12.5 10.5 14.6 29.6 6.93 5.10 12.36 9.67 
Wall 5 23.0 4.0 2.6 5.7 7.66 5.93 11.46 8.97 
Lower-Middle Income 20 22.6 11.4 13.7 9.1 3.70 3.26 12.27 8.35 
Low Income 5 10.2 6.7 15.2 8.8 3.71 3.26 12.49 8.44 
 
Open 6 5.5 3.1 5.2 9.0 8.20 5.01 13.76 10.89 
Gate 10 13.7 22.2 17.0 8.5 8.18 5.42 15.31 12.53 
Wall 9 16.7 7.6 11.2 8.4 8.59 5.98 14.67 11.96 
 
Table A2. Median Absolute Deviation and Absolute Volatilities in Trade Groups 
Specification 
Group 
Size 
Median Absolute Deviation 
(%) 
Absolute Volatility (%) 
Y C I TBY Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 34.4 3.8 8.1 9.9 3.71 3.27 12.20 8.21 
Net Commodity          
Exporters 31 19.0 16.2 16.3 15.7 7.25 4.75 11.91 9.34 
 Open 9 8.1 6.1 13.7 12.1 5.85 3.73 9.74 7.71 
 Gate 18 19.7 16.5 18.3 27.7 7.10 4.66 12.32 9.33 
  Wall 4 7.1 9.5 3.8 8.8 8.80 5.86 13.67 10.97 
Importers 56 14.8 11.9 15.5 11.1 6.06 4.40 11.17 8.68 
 Open 23 12.8 11.1 18.3 9.5 4.37 3.12 8.65 6.44 
 Gate 24 23.3 12.5 14.4 8.8 5.81 4.22 11.29 8.59 
  Wall 9 19.7 10.1 9.5 7.1 8.01 5.86 13.57 10.99 
Oil Traders          
Exporters 21 23.0 22.0 13.1 25.6 6.75 4.64 11.64 9.01 
 Open 5 7.9 8.5 4.1 7.3 5.38 3.41 9.91 7.38 
 Gate 13 15.2 5.9 13.2 29.3 7.03 4.67 12.33 9.66 
  Wall 3 1.9 10.8 5.0 5.7 7.84 6.55 11.51 8.88 
Importers 66 15.0 10.2 15.1 10.4 3.37 2.98 11.74 8.03 
 Open 27 7.9 8.5 4.1 7.3 4.67 3.27 8.78 6.69 
 Gate 29 15.2 5.9 13.2 29.3 6.06 4.29 11.46 8.57 
  Wall 10 18.7 8.8 12.9 8.8 8.38 5.65 14.23 11.62 
Excluding Large           
Commodity Exporters 50 31.1 23.8 20.9 15.9 6.95 4.77 12.51 9.71 
 Open 13 9.9 15.0 16.8 3.9 6.76 4.51 11.60 9.05 
 Gate 26 20.9 8.6 14.5 8.8 6.37 4.26 12.23 9.24 
  Wall 11 18.3 10.1 8.4 9.0 8.53 6.29 14.24 11.60 
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Table A3. Median Absolute Deviation and Absolute Volatilities in Geographic Regions 
Specification 
Group 
Size 
Median Average Deviation (%) Absolute Volatility (%) 
Y C I TBY Y C I TBY 
Baseline 89 34.4 3.8 8.1 9.9 3.71 3.27 12.20 8.21 
East Asia, South 
Asia & Pacific  
16 13.5 4.9 25.5 7.4 6.48 4.54 11.24 8.72 
 Open 4 7.3 3.5 28.2 3.3 4.18 2.90 7.32 5.28 
 Gate 6 19.8 10.7 26.2 16.3 6.78 4.84 12.76 10.07 
  Wall 6 12.0 5.0 15.5 4.6 7.71 5.32 12.33 9.68 
Europe, Central 
Asia and North 
America 
28 14.0 14.8 13.7 10.7 0.04 4.00 2.79 8.09 
 Open 15 11.8 14.1 11.7 17.1 2.97 2.14 6.53 4.63 
 Gate 13 13.4 9.7 20.7 6.6 5.19 3.55 9.89 7.05 
  Wall - - - - - - - - - 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
17 16.3 17.5 13.7 14.1 6.39 4.18 11.69 9.16 
 Open 8 11.3 12.2 12.6 6.5 6.76 4.37 12.34 9.97 
 Gate 9 16.3 13.5 8.7 18.7 6.06 4.01 11.11 8.44 
  Wall - - - - - - - - - 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
14 12.7 11.6 17.8 16.1 6.92 5.08 12.41 9.37 
 Open 3 2.0 8.5 4.1 4.8 7.27 4.48 12.22 9.17 
 Gate 8 14.2 18.1 9.9 19.1 6.69 4.93 12.77 9.54 
  Wall 3 0.5 1.9 3.3 0.9 7.21 6.09 11.63 9.14 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 19.0 20.7 13.4 12.4 8.79 6.13 14.89 12.31 
 Open 2 26.3 7.7 3.7 3.6 7.97 6.58 12.05 9.90 
 Gate 7 15.4 25.4 11.4 11.6 8.48 5.62 14.84 12.20 
  Wall 5 11.3 14.1 4.9 5.2 9.55 6.67 16.09 13.41 
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Appendix 4. Share of Variances Explained by World Shocks and Mediated by 
Commodity Prices in Different Countries by Using Sequential Estimation 
Country 
Corrected estimates Uncorrected estimates 
Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) 
Algeria 1.1 21.0 17.4 28.5 20.2 35.6 31.4 39.7 
Angola 39.7 14.8 20.0 35.8 48.9 28.6 32.7 46.6 
Argentina 63.1 66.8 54.3 45.4 68.8 71.8 61.6 54.9 
Australia 23.1 1.1 19.5 33.9 33.0 13.6 29.1 42.1 
Austria 35.6 3.5 25.6 25.8 43.4 16.5 34.6 34.6 
Bahrain 13.7 26.2 44.6 28.5 33.7 43.3 54.9 42.4 
Bangladesh 12.1 0.5 4.8 2.6 27.7 16.1 20.8 15.1 
Belgium 63.7 33.8 54.7 36.1 68.6 43.1 60.5 44.9 
Bolivia 54.2 10.9 21.1 2.0 60.9 26.1 33.7 19.0 
Brazil 24.3 14.2 17.1 48.5 36.1 29.4 30.5 56.1 
Bulgaria 59.2 61.3 15.7 63.3 65.6 67.0 32.0 69.1 
Burkina Faso 25.6 32.5 2.6 12.8 36.9 41.7 18.4 26.1 
Canada 24.8 21.6 38.5 42.5 35.5 32.8 46.2 49.4 
Chile 20.1 26.7 41.6 18.8 30.6 36.8 48.1 29.9 
China 62.0 17.0 57.4 17.6 67.1 32.5 63.3 31.9 
Colombia 62.5 56.9 70.6 69.5 67.2 63.1 74.9 73.0 
Costa Rica 23.5 26.8 7.5 1.5 32.7 34.6 18.3 13.3 
Cote d'Ivoire 11.8 31.4 24.9 3.8 28.4 42.1 36.9 12.2 
Cyprus 40.3 22.2 36.4 9.5 49.1 33.4 46.3 24.4 
Czech Republic 45.3 7.0 22.7 15.7 56.9 18.8 39.9 34.3 
Denmark 21.6 1.4 19.0 2.4 31.6 13.7 30.4 16.8 
Dominican Republic 4.1 27.7 15.2 11.8 20.0 38.1 28.3 23.0 
Ecuador 65.4 40.0 5.6 3.3 68.1 45.4 16.7 15.4 
Egypt. Arab Rep. 15.6 18.7 31.3 30.5 29.0 31.8 41.4 40.0 
El Salvador 18.2 1.2 7.5 11.9 32.4 19.2 12.3 26.3 
Ethiopia 2.2 34.4 27.4 4.1 18.9 44.2 38.3 12.6 
Finland 40.7 35.9 30.4 0.1 47.9 43.5 40.4 15.5 
France 65.6 62.4 74.2 27.3 68.8 66.0 76.4 36.9 
Germany 34.6 5.2 38.7 12.9 44.8 22.6 48.7 26.8 
Ghana 38.5 2.1 2.9 15.7 45.8 10.8 9.3 26.8 
Greece 36.6 31.5 12.2 26.9 44.7 40.1 24.7 36.4 
Guatemala 25.5 9.3 4.8 8.5 34.8 23.2 16.7 4.2 
Hong Kong SAR 41.6 18.4 6.3 13.9 48.9 30.1 20.0 25.6 
Hungary 0.2 29.8 13.4 5.1 16.4 38.9 4.9 18.6 
Iceland 37.5 27.2 18.0 7.0 44.8 35.9 29.2 20.0 
India 37.9 30.9 35.2 22.9 46.2 40.8 44.2 34.2 
Indonesia 66.0 55.3 65.1 61.3 70.7 61.0 69.7 66.4 
Iran. Islamic Rep. 39.0 54.8 8.0 0.4 49.4 61.2 25.2 16.6 
Ireland 30.0 21.5 12.5 22.8 39.0 32.1 25.1 32.1 
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Appendix 6 continues.  
Country 
Corrected estimates Uncorrected estimates 
Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) 
Israel 4.7 7.9 14.4 12.1 18.8 6.8 3.6 23.2 
Italy 61.9 31.9 42.1 0.8 66.3 41.4 49.2 14.6 
Japan 34.1 24.8 56.5 20.6 41.9 34.7 60.3 31.1 
Kenya 65.7 60.0 33.9 33.1 70.1 65.1 44.1 43.2 
Korea. Rep. 7.8 3.9 1.7 3.7 20.9 11.3 14.1 18.3 
Kuwait 6.6 16.1 32.2 2.0 21.7 27.0 42.8 16.9 
Lebanon 42.1 22.6 44.4 0.0 54.3 38.3 55.1 21.3 
Malaysia 26.0 44.8 22.4 22.9 35.1 50.6 32.6 32.2 
Malta 32.5 34.1 43.6 51.9 45.3 44.8 53.1 59.6 
Mauritius 20.9 19.4 56.4 23.2 33.9 31.7 62.2 34.7 
Mexico 49.0 27.1 21.2 0.1 56.8 38.7 34.0 18.9 
Morocco 0.6 8.4 20.6 27.7 12.9 5.9 32.4 37.8 
Myanmar 61.5 49.1 57.6 2.3 67.7 58.3 64.0 18.4 
Netherlands 45.1 16.3 17.6 6.4 51.5 28.6 28.4 10.0 
New Zealand 5.5 16.5 0.0 18.6 20.0 29.5 15.9 29.5 
Nicaragua 9.2 9.1 0.1 17.4 22.9 22.3 16.5 30.2 
Nigeria 76.4 59.8 19.8 32.6 79.4 65.2 33.5 43.0 
Norway 5.8 3.6 4.4 5.7 20.1 17.7 11.5 10.3 
Oman 0.0 32.2 6.1 57.7 0.0 46.0 19.7 66.3 
Pakistan 47.3 29.9 18.9 26.8 55.5 41.5 32.4 39.2 
Panama 57.6 19.0 46.8 16.0 64.3 32.3 54.7 29.2 
Paraguay 59.4 44.7 62.0 26.5 64.5 52.4 66.4 36.6 
Peru 12.2 2.3 25.4 18.2 22.5 13.8 32.9 27.0 
Philippines 18.2 20.8 7.7 6.9 32.2 33.2 23.5 10.3 
Poland 26.9 27.6 41.6 1.4 41.8 41.5 52.6 18.2 
Portugal 50.1 36.9 15.5 9.7 55.7 45.0 27.5 6.6 
Romania 2.9 23.8 37.0 51.4 22.9 39.2 49.9 59.8 
Russian Federation 76.5 56.7 80.8 70.7 79.6 63.7 83.4 76.0 
Saudi Arabia 26.4 60.1 71.7 32.2 38.8 65.6 75.3 43.5 
Singapore 48.8 25.3 72.2 10.6 55.9 37.6 75.5 24.2 
Slovenia 12.3 0.3 9.8 11.7 11.4 17.1 12.2 26.6 
South Africa 54.0 66.5 72.4 69.6 60.3 71.0 76.1 73.2 
Spain 60.6 57.0 45.8 39.0 64.1 61.4 52.9 46.7 
Sri Lanka 50.0 23.8 73.0 30.0 56.5 35.0 76.5 40.7 
Swaziland 55.8 65.0 17.6 35.2 61.4 70.5 32.2 45.8 
Sweden 22.9 7.5 41.8 2.8 34.6 8.1 48.3 17.1 
Switzerland 59.4 68.2 61.1 2.6 63.7 71.3 65.2 10.2 
Tanzania 73.6 4.0 63.7 30.3 76.3 17.5 67.5 41.2 
Thailand 9.9 0.7 9.4 8.6 23.1 15.7 21.8 20.3 
Togo 36.4 19.1 39.5 38.3 46.6 33.6 47.8 47.3 
Tunisia 21.2 12.5 40.3 40.5 34.9 7.1 50.7 49.2 
54 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 continues. 
Country 
Corrected estimates Uncorrected estimates 
Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) Y (%) C (%) I (%) TB/Y (%) 
Turkey 2.9 10.2 11.6 10.6 18.2 8.2 25.2 23.9 
Uganda 46.0 19.7 57.8 24.6 55.7 33.9 64.0 36.7 
United Arab Emirates 59.0 26.6 38.8 9.2 64.6 37.5 47.0 23.7 
United Kingdom 60.4 65.6 52.0 44.2 64.8 68.9 57.5 50.6 
United States 35.5 46.0 24.6 62.1 43.9 52.2 34.9 65.7 
Uruguay 43.2 14.7 42.2 4.2 48.7 23.7 47.5 8.3 
Venezuela. RB 34.8 55.9 30.0 34.1 43.6 61.5 39.8 43.7 
Yemen. Rep. 15.7 61.1 12.4 61.3 11.8 68.8 32.1 69.4 
Zambia 13.7 10.2 1.9 35.3 28.0 24.9 15.1 44.8 
Median 35.5 24.8 25.4 18.6 44.7 35.9 36.9 31.1 
MAD 34.4 3.8 8.1 9.9 24.4 0.3 5.6 8.6 
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